COMMENTS

Contracting for Security: Paying Married
Women What They've Earned
Katharine K. Bakert
[W]e do not have promises because we have a law of contracts; we have a law of contracts because we have promises.1
Divorce is an economic disaster for women.' The latest census
figures reveal that only 15 percent of divorced women in this country are awarded any alimony or maintenance payments. Of that 15
percent, only a small percentage receive any of the awarded
money. The mean annual alimony income for those who do receive
money is only $3,733.3 A recent California study found that the
standard of living for men increases 42 percent after divorce, while
the standard of living for women decreases by 73 percent. 4 A similar study in Vermont showed men's per capita income rising by 120
percent and women's decreasing by 33 percent.5 Divorce always has
t A.B. Harvard University; J.D. Candidate 1989, University of Chicago.
1 Harold C. Havighurst, The Nature of Private Contract 10 (Northwestern, 1961).
2 James B. McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for
Women and Children, 21 Family L Q 351 (1987).
1 Bureau of the Census, Child Support and Alimony: 1985; Current Population Reports
(Advance Data from March-April 1986 Current Population Surveys), Series P-23, No 152 at
14 (1987).
Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution 338-39 (Free Press, 1985). One significant cause of the economic disparity between divorced men and women is men's consistent
failure to pay what courts order them to pay. A recent study found that one of every six
men was in arrears on alimony payments within six months of the divorce decree, owing an
average of over $1,000. Id at 192. The notoriously difficult problem of enforcement is beyond
the scope of this comment.
Weitzman also notes that there is no reason to presume that lack of alimony might be
compensated for by greater child support payments. Alimony is tax-deductible for the man;
child support is not. Both are taxable to the woman. Thus, if anything, one should be wary
of men's incentive to inflate alimony figures at the expense of accurate child-support
awards. Id at 186.
5 Heather Ruth Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 Family L Q
79, 97 (1986).

1193

1194

The University of Chicago Law Review

[55:1193

been economically difficult for women, but recent changes in alimony and maintenance laws seem to have made things worse, not
better.6 The divorce reform laws, instituted throughout the 1970s,
were meant to eliminate outmoded gender stereotypes within the
law and were seen as an outgrowth of the movement for women's
equality; yet they do not appear to have helped women at all. Several commentators have attributed women's worsened position to
the decreased bargaining power that resulted from the elimination
of divorce based on fault.7 Previously, a woman could manipulate

the fault standard when her husband had to induce her cooperation in staging a fault divorce or she could make her alimony demand seem more compelling by painting her husband as the culpable party. Yet, even assuming this theory is correct, reinstituting
fault-based divorce proceedings would be inappropriate given the
now almost universally accepted notion that marriages can disintegrate without one party being more blameworthy than the
other. The present system may not be compensating women fairly,
but that does not mean that we should return to the past.
There are many possible ways of categorizing the marriage relationship. Two legal paradigms, partnership and contract, are potentially applicable, though the law has been extremely reluctant
to fully cognize marriage as either. This reluctance stems, no
doubt, from the nature of marriage. Marriage is a legal relationship, but it is a personal, sexual, and often religious relationship as
well. Regulating or legally defining such a relationship is invasive,
difficult, and easily discriminatory. Nonetheless, the law does impose some matrimonial obligations.
The purpose behind alimony in this country until the early
1970s was to require the male to fulfill his lifelong support obligation.' As divorce became more commonplace and as more wogien
of all classes began to participate in the paid labor force, the con' See Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution at xi-xiv (cited in note 4) and McLindon, 21
Family L Q 351 (cited in note 2). See also Robert E. McGraw, Gloria J. Sterin and Joseph
M. Davis, A Case Study In Divorce Law Reform and Its Aftermath, 20 J Family L 443, 473
(1982) (finding that the number of alimony awards went down between 1965 and 1978, but
noting that this decline is not necessarily attributable to statutory changes).
' Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social
Change: A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of Divorce, 1983 Wisc L Rev
789, 801. See also McLindon, 21 Family L Q at 395 (cited in note 2).
S The male obligation to support had been a part of marital law since the Middle Ages.
Complete divorce, at that time, was non-existent; alimony was an ecclesiastical court order
that insured that a husband continued to fulfill his legal and religious obligation of lifelong
support to his wife following a judicial separation. Homer H. Clark, The Law of Domestic
Relations in the United States 420 (West, 1968).
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cept of lifelong support began to grow anachronistic.' Many states,
eager to abandon the idea of support, replaced the term "alimony,"
which means support or sustenance, 10 with "spousal maintenance."" What "maintenance" is remains unclear.
Almost all states provide for some form of alimony or maintenance payment, but a dependent spouse is not automatically entitled to a monetary award upon divorce. The factors that now go
into determining a maintenance award vary between states and
often within states. State statutes give courts some guidelines, but
statutes differ and courts often disregard them or apply them
inconsistently.
This comment offers a way to determine spousal compensation
that will both compensate woman appropriately without encouraging dependency, and will provide firm, unambiguous guidance to
courts. Section I discusses the distinction between monetary payments and property division and analyzes the appropriateness of a
marriage-as-partnership paradigm in light of that distinction. Section II briefly outlines the current state statutory alimony standards and the ways in which some courts stray from these standards. Section III examines why the current standards leave
women undercompensated. Finally, after a discussion of previously
suggested solutions in Section IV, Section V offers its own solution,
rooted in contract theory, to the problem of structuring marital
compensation.
I. PROPERTY DIVISION AND THE PARTNERSHIP PARADIGM
A.

Property Division

Before evaluating alimony or maintenance standards, it is necessary to distinguish between two important concepts in the law of
marriage dissolution: monetary compensation, called alimony or
maintenance, and property division. Most states provide for an equitable division of marital property at marriage dissolution.1 2 All
I Most women affected by regulation or a requirement of alimony are members of the
middle and upper class. When these women began to earn their own money, the need for
lifelong support became less compelling.
1" Black's Law Dictionary 67 (West, 5th ed 1983).
11 Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) § 308, 9 Unif L Annot 347 (West, 1987).
12 What constitutes marital property varies from state to state. In community property
states, all property acquired during the marriage is owned jointly by both spouses and must
be evenly divided. In equitable distribution states (i.e., non-community property states),
courts have more discretion in determining what constitutes joint property. The UMDA
encourages the use of property division as the means of providing for the financial needs of
the parties. Id (notes accompanying the Act).
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property accumulated during the marriage must be divided between the spouses. This is property division. Monetary compensation involves paying an ex-spouse money in addition to any property that she has received pursuant to an equitable division."3 If
the definition of property could be infinitely expanded, provisions
for equal property division might be an effective way of equitably
compensating dependent spouses. The problem is that courts are
very reluctant to expand the definition of property, and when that
which the law currently calls property is divided, women are left
severely undercompensated.
When two people marry they usually agree to share their economic wealth forever. 14 At marriage dissolution, courts attempt to
divide a couple's valuable assets, but many commonly recognized
sources of wealth, even if labelled as property, are very difficult to
divide. Business goodwill, education, employment promotion, and
future income streams are but a few examples of sources of wealth
that courts are either reluctant to define as property or are unable
to divide. These sources of wealth provide much of the economic
security in the majority of marriages, and it is precisely these intangible benefits which women are deprived of at marriage dissolution. This deprivation is particularly crippling because most
women reasonably rely on sharing the intangible benefits accumulated during the marriage.
Some states have attempted to alleviate this problem somewhat by classifying professional degrees as property. Michigan put
a monetary value on a law degree 5 and New York did the same for
a medical license.' 6 Yet many more states, even when confronted
with situations in which there appears to be very little property
that can be equitably divided, have strongly resisted the trend of
expanding the definition of property to include professional
1" For convenience and because it is unquestionably grounded in reality, I will use female pronouns when referring to dependent spouses and male pronouns when describing
primary bread-winners.
" People are, of course, free to shape their economic marital agreements differently,
but the law and most people assume that the economic resources will be shared equally and
for the duration of the parties' lives.
'5 Woodworth v Woodworth, 126 Mich App 258, 337 NW2d 332, 334 (1983). The court
ruled that Mrs. Woodworth had a property interest in her husband's law degree.
"8O'Brien v O'Brien, 66 NY2d 576, 580, 498 NYS2d 743 (1985). But see Cronin v
Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879, 502 NYS2d 368 (1986) (refusing to quantify a non-professional
degree.) Recently, a New York Supreme Court judge ruled that O'Brien compelled finding
that the increase in value of a spouse's acting and modelling career is marital property.
Golub v Golub, 139 Misc 2d 440, 527 NYS2d 946, 950 (March 1988). However, no award was
made on this basis because the judge found no evidence regarding the value of the acting
career.

19881

Contractingfor Security

1197

degrees. 17
Even if courts consistently treated professional degrees as
property, however, there are other intangible benefits more resistant to division. For instance, many women contribute significantly
to their husbands' careers by doing clerical work, making important business contacts, and doing extensive entertaining."8 Often
these efforts greatly enhance the husband's potential for career advancement. This property can be defined as the husband's promotion potential to which the woman directly contributed. Dividing
that property is very difficult. One solution is to define all of the
man's future income stream as property and allocate an equitable
share of that to the woman. Yet this solution would require invasive, on-going court evaluation to adjust and enforce the mandated
payments.' 9 Furthermore, dividing a future income stream would
create a permanent debt relationship between two people trying to
dissolve their relationship. Any post-divorce monetary payment
will involve some kind of debt relationship, but given the often uncomfortable relations between ex-spouses, all attempts should be
made to limit that debt relationship. These problems make pure
property division, even with an extraordinarily expanded definition
of property, a problematic means of equitably dissolving a marital
agreement.
B. The Partnership Paradigm
The distinction between property and monetary compensation
reveals the flaws in the popular but misguided marriage-as-partnership analogy.2" Partnership remedies are inapplicable in open-

17 See, for example, In Re Marriage of Rubinstein, 145 Ill App 3d 31, 495 NE2d 659,
664-665 (1986); Archer v Archer, 303 Md 347, 493 A2d 1074, 1079 (1985); Hodge v Hodge,
337 Pa Super 151, 486 A2d 951, 953 (1984), aff'd 513 Pa 264, 520 A2d 15 (1986).
18 This kind of spousal contribution appears to be the rule, not the exception, at least
among college graduates. In a 1976 survey of married male college graduates, only 14% replied that their wives had no involvement in their careers. Another study concluded that a
woman's college education did more to raise her husband's income than it did to raise her
own earning level. These surveys can be found in Barbara F. Reskin and Heidi I. Hartmann,
eds, Women's Work, Men's Work: Sex Segregation on the Job 70 (National Academy Press,
1986) ("Women's Work").
" Alternatively a court could simply award a portion of the present value of the husband's future income stream, avoiding the problems of continual readjustment. Yet determining the present value of a man's "promotion potential" would be difficult enough; determining the woman's share of that present value would be nearly impossible.
20 For cases treating marriage as a partnership, see Dyer v Tsapis, 162 W Va 289, 249
SE2d 509, 511 (1978). ("The law which once saw marriage as a sacrament now conceptualizes it as roughly analogous to a business partnership." (footnote omitted)); O'Brien, 66
NY2d at 585 ("Marriage is, among other things, an economic partnership to which both
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ended, highly diversified agreements like marriage because partnership analogies fail to capture the security interest that is an inherent part of married life.
A partnership paradigm for alimony analogizes a husband's
net worth and earning potential to a profitable business. When a
profitable business partnership must be dissolved due to a death or
other unforeseen contingency, there is almost always a contractual
provision in the partnership agreement that defines how the interests in the future profits should be allocated. 2 1 The law has recognized that the ex ante expectations of the parties themselves, as
expressed in a dissolution contract, are the appropriate tools to use
when deciding how to dissolve a business agreement. Thus, the
courts rarely get involved in deciding how the future assets, like
income streams and good will, should be divided. Absent an explicit allocation provision, courts simply dissolve the partnership.2
In the marital realm, antenuptial agreements are subject to
strict judicial scrutiny, particularly in the case of traditional marriages.2 3 These agreements do not exist in the vast majority of marriages, even when the courts would enforce them. Thus, the far
greater problem is what to do in their absence.
Marriage involves an agreement to share profits and liabilities
in all enterprises forever. This agreement entails far more economic interdependency, division of labor, and lost opportunities
than business relationships ever contemplate. Married people often
rely on lifelong commitment. If a woman did not believe that she
and her husband would be sharing their economic resources for-

parties contribute"). See also, Lenore Weitzman, The Marriage Contract 88 (Free Press,
1976).
21 Robert W. Hamilton, Cases and Materials On Corporations,Including Partnerships
and Limited Partnerships97 (West, 3d ed 1986).
22 The widely followed Uniform Partnership Act requires that in the absence of a dissolution provision, all affairs be wound up and the profitable business be dissolved. Uniform
Partnership Act § 30, 6 Unif L Annot 367 (West, 1969). Thus, when the court must get
involved, it solves the problem of how to divide future assets by eliminating those assets.
23 Weitzman, The Marriage Contract at 341 (cited in note 20). Traditionally, these
agreements have been voided as against public policy because any such agreement necessarily contemplates divorce. Some states have begun to enforce them, however. See id at 347351, and cases cited therein. These jurisdictions do not hold that antenuptial agreements are
per se against public policy, but they ordinarily require that there be full and fair disclosure
and that both parties have had an opportunity to consult with counsel prior to signing such
an agreement. See Friedlanderv Friedlander,80 Wash 2d 293, 300, 494 P2d 208 (1972) and
Minn Stat § 519.11 (1980).
Even if such agreements were more common, one can readily see why courts should be
hesitant to enforce them. The unforeseen circumstances inherent in all marriages, and particularly in marriages of any significant duration, would make ex ante attempts to distribute
future assets fairly appear highly suspect.
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ever, it is unlikely that she would be willing to make the economic
sacrifices that staying at home entails. Business people do not rely
as much on their business partner and rarely make decisions that
look completely irrational on an objective economic scale.
Moreover, from an economic perspective, married people make
seemingly irrational decisions, such as a woman's decision to stay
home with the children or to do unpaid housework, all the time.
This is because the marketplace fails to capture the value that
most of society places on spouses staying at home. If the marketplace accurately assessed the demand for women to stay home, the
monetary value of the services she performed there would go up to
reflect people's desires.
Alternatively, a mother staying at home with her children may
provide a unique service that the market is incapable of valuing. If
no one can replace a natural mother, then the market cannot provide any replacement value for her services. Either theory for why
the market fails to capture the true value of a spouse staying at
home belies the adequacy of a partnership analogy.
Partnership models are effective and equitable when there is a
way to measure objectively both parties' commitments. When a
monetary scale can capture how parties to a business agreement
value their resources, the remedies at dissolution are likely to be
fair to all parties. In marriage, sacrifices for non-monetary reasons
are common, and, if marriage is a desirable institution, necessary.
Partnership law, which only provides for a division of assets and
liabilities within specific, defined business endeavors, cannot adequately compensate for these sacrifices. Marriage is too complex an
entity for the relatively simplistic partnership paradigm to provide
appropriate relief.
This comment, therefore, looks to contract paradigms and the
theory of restitution and reliance remedies, as a way to provide
equitable relief at marriage dissolution. Under the solution proposed in this comment, the dependent spouse is awarded restitution for any measurable contribution that she made to the marriage. If the husband has been enriched at her expense, she is
compensated. Additionally, the dependent spouse is awarded reliance compensation for the loss she has suffered due to her household contribution. The reliance award is based on the amount of
paid work the dependent spouse forwent in expectation of the economic security that her husband would provide. She is awarded a
percentage of her husband's earnings for all the years in which she
did a disproportionate amount of household work. If both restitu-
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tion and reliance are applicable, both should be awarded.24
II.

CURRENT STATUTORY LAW

Current statutory standards fare little better than the partnership analogy in attempting to resolve the economic hardships of
divorce. At first glance, the wide variety of statutory guidelines appears to offer alternative standards under which to award monetary compensation, but in reality, most courts look at substantially
similar factors when determining an appropriate award. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, adopted in part or in whole by
many states, awards maintenance in accordance with a need standard.2 5 States that have not adopted the Uniform Act's maintenance provisions usually follow one of two paths. Their statutes
either list a number of factors to be considered, regardless of
whether there is established need, or they give the courts complete
discretion to consider whatever criteria the courts feel appropriate. 26 The effect of these approaches is essentially the same, however, because the courts simply adopt through case law criteria
that are not written into the statute.v Without question, the most
important of these criteria is a determination of what the dependent spouse needs to rehabilitate herself.
This section will briefly describe both how the Uniform Act's
need standard and rehabilitative maintenance operate. It will also
offer a quick survey of the alternative factors on which courts have
based awards when straying from their standard guidelines.
A.

The Uniform Act - Need

Section 308 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act of 1970
defines when spousal maintenance should be awarded and what
21

See section V.B. for a complete description of the proposed model.

25 UMDA, § 308, 9 Unif L Annot at 347 (cited in note 11).

Examples of states that enumerate factors to be considered are Washington (Wash
Rev Code Ann § 26.09.090 (West 1973)), New York (NY Dom Rel Law § 236, Part B, (6)(a)
(McKinney 1986)), and Pennsylvania (23 Pa Stat § 501 (Purdon 1980)). The number of
factors enumerated ranges from six (Washington) to fourteen (Pennsylvania). States that
leave the factors to be considered to the court's discretion include New Jersey (NJ Stat §
2A:34-23 (1984)), and North Dakota (ND Cent Code § 14-05-24 (1981)).
217
New Jersey generally awards rehabilitative maintenance, for example, though the
statute does not mention it. Lepis v Lepis, 83 NJ 139, 416 A2d 45, 53 (1980). Washington
has looked at maintenance as a way to equitably distribute the overall reduction in a
couple's joint standard of living when one spouse attends school, even though the statute
does not express that standard. Washburn v Washburn, 101 Wash 2d 168, 677 P2d 152, 159
(1984). The case law in Oklahoma has developed twenty-two factors to be considered. 49 J
Okla Bar Assoc 492, 496-97 (1978).
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factors should be taken into consideration when making such an
award. The Uniform Act states that "the court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse only if it finds that the spouse
seeking maintenance: (1) lacks sufficient property to provide for
his reasonable needs; and (2) is unable to support himself through
appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances makes it appropriate that the custodian
should not be required to seek employment outside the home."2
The purpose of these need stipulations is to discourage maintenance awards and provide for the financial needs of the parties
through property division.2 9 If the two above conditions are met,
the Act then outlines various factors for the court to consider in
determining an award, such as the financial resources of the party
seeking maintenance, the time necessary for that person to find
appropriate employment and the standard of living established
during the marriage.8 0 The court cannot consider any of these
modifying factors unless sufficient need has first been established.
For instance, the Uniform Act's need standard prevented a
28 UMDA § 308, 9 Unif L Annot at 347 (cited in note 11), states in full:

(a) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, or maintenance
following a decree of dissolution of the marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the court may grant a maintenance order for either
spouse only if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:
(1) lacks sufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs; and
(2) is unable to support himself through appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home.
(b) The maintenance order shall be in amounts and for periods of time the court
deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, and after considering all relevant
factors including:
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital
property apportioned to him, his ability to meet his needs independently, and the extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party includes a sum for
that party as custodian;
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the
party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(3) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the age and physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance; and
(6) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs
while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
Some states, such as Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Montana, Missouri and
Minnesota, have adopted the entire Act. Id at 149. Others have adopted parts of the Act.
For the purposes of this analysis, all states using the Act's maintenance provisions will be
treated similarly.
29 Id at 348 (comments accompanying the Act).
20 See note 28.
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Missouri woman who had not worked at all during her twenty-four
year marriage from getting any compensation. Her husband earned
$2,444 a month after taxes; she had started working for minimum
wage in a nursing home. The appellate court upheld the trial
court's finding that the woman was capable of supporting herself
adequately.
Although ordinarily we would be something less than sanguine
about the prospect that a woman of forty-nine with virtually
no outside employment experience in twenty-three years, educated only to the extent of a no-longer-adequate teaching license, 'obviously' has the ability to improve her earnings, the
trial court had the advantage of observing her at trial, and
found her 'bright and responsive.' 31
Because she was bright and responsive and appeared to be capable of earning more than her current salary, she did not establish need and hence was denied all maintenance.3 2
B. Rehabilitation
In both Uniform Act and non-Uniform Act states, the overwhelming majority of alimony payments are awarded as rehabilitation. The Uniform Act provides rehabilitative maintenance for
women who have met the threshold need test. Most states that
have not adopted the Uniform Act have established very strong
rehabilitative trends.3 The purpose of the rehabilitative standard
is to allocate enough money to the dependant spouse for her to
rehabilitate the job skills that have been dormant or underutilized
during her marriage. The most important factor in the rehabilitative award is the amount of time the woman needs to acquire sufficient training to enable her to find appropriate employment. Thus,
rehabilitative maintenance awards are temporary; the court determines how long it will take the dependent spouse to rehabilitate
herself and awards maintenance only for that period of time. 4
Roberts v Roberts, 652 SW2d 325, 330 (Mo App 1983).
See also In Re Marriageof Donovan, 122 Ill App 3d 803, 462 NE2d 9, 12 (1984).
3 See, for example, New York (NY Dom Rel Law § 236 (McKinney 1986)), California
(Cal Family Law Code § 4801 (West 1986)), and Florida (Fla Stat § 61.08 (1986)).
3' The pejorative
connotations of the word "rehabilitate" reveal one of the major
problems with divorce law in general. The homemaker's job is not respected. Homemakers,
therefore, must be "rehabilitated," not compensated or made whole. The term "rehabilitation" implies that the woman has been doing something of very little value. Yet, presumably, a married couple would not choose to have the wife assume household duties unless
they valued the work done in the home. They would pay someone else to perform the work
31

32 Id.
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3 5
In Dahlberg v Dahlberg,
a Minnesota appeals court upheld

an award of rehabilitative alimony for a woman who had been married twenty-five years and worked as a traditional housewife,
spending a significant amount of time with the couple's retarded
daughter. Prior to the marriage, Mrs. Dahlberg had been a secretary, an assembler, an inspector, and a switchboard operator. Her
husband was an executive vice-president of a large company earning $92,500 a year plus bonuses ranging from $200 to $14,000. Mrs.
Dahlberg was awarded $1300 a month for seven years. Two of the
children were still minors and there was expert testimony that it
would take her two to four years to re-enter the work force.36 Thus,
five years after the divorce, at age 49 (after her children had
reached majority), she had7 two years of $1300 per month to enable
3
her to start a new career.

C.

Other Standards

Courts do occasionally rely on factors other than need or rehabilitation. Often, these factors are not listed in the statute, and
even when they are listed, it is not clear when they should be invoked. It is important to mention these alternatives, however, because the courts' occasional reliance on them demonstrates the extent to which both the need and rehabilitation standards fail."
1. Restitution.
Restitution as a basis for maintenance awards has had a mixed
reception. Many courts have been hesitant to award any kind of
restitution remedy because of a belief that alimony ought to focus
with the money the wife could earn in the wage market.
" Dahlberg v Dahlberg, 358 NW2d 76 (Minn App 1984).
36

Id at 82.

37

The appeals court implied that this amount of maintenance was higher than neces-

sary. Yet, it found that this "substantial" award was justified because the lower court
awarded a small amount of child support. Id at 82. See also Wilhelm v Wilhelm, 688 SW2d
381 (Mo App 1985). A Missouri court awarded a divorced woman $400 a month for two
years after a twenty-one year marriage. She had held various part-time jobs for the last ten
years of their marriage and her income following the separation was just over $14,000. The

husband had an income of roughly $33,000 a year. Given her part-time work experience, the
wife was deemed able to support herself appropriately after a payment of $400 a month for
two years. Similarly, in In Re Marriage of Pekar, 218 Cal Rptr 823, 173 Cal App 3d 367
(1985), the court awarded an eighteen year housewife five years of alimony at $650 per
month. Three years before the marriage, she had begun working temporarily in a clerical job
and had since found a job as a secretary earning $1,730 a month. Her husband was the vicepresident of a bank, earning $4,327 a month.
" The problems with need and rehabilitation are developed more fully in section III.
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on the future, not the past. 9 Some have referred to "reimburse' 40
ment alimony" as a "contradiction in terms.
Other courts and statutes have found it necessary to look back
at the woman's contribution, however. The Pennsylvania divorce
statute, for example, lists "the contribution of a spouse as homemaker" as a factor to be considered in awarding support. 41 New
York requires the consideration of the "contributions and services
of the party seeking maintenance... to the career or career potential of the other party. ' 42 Washington has twice awarded maintenance based on the woman's contribution, both times specifically
rejecting a rehabilitative standard, despite the fact that the statute
mentions rehabilitation but not restitution. 43 A Wisconsin court ordered the trial court to consider the possibility of a maintenance
award, even though the wife received 70 percent of the proceeds
from the sale of the family home: "[The] working spouse was entitled to be fairly compensated for her costs of support," and the
proceeds from the house were "insufficient compensation for her
significantly greater contributions to the marriage. '44 This criterion is particularly relevant in cases where women have worked
and economically supported the marriage while husbands obtained
further education.
2. Foregone opportunities.
Related to the concept of compensation for previous contribution is the notion of compensation for foregone opportunities. Theoretically, a foregone opportunity award should compensate a woman for the opportunity costs she incurred by remaining in the
home and out of the workforce. She could have gone to work. She
" Skelton v Skelton, 490 A2d 1204, 1207 (Me 1985). The court wrote, "Is alimony
properly awarded to compensate a divorcing spouse for her 'years of service' in the past, or
does it look to the future, acting as a substitute for the loss of support enjoyed during the
preceding years.... The answer is clearly the latter." It concluded that the woman's contribution should only be considered in the property distribution, not in an alimony award. Id
at 1207-1208.
" Reiss v Reiss, 200 NJ Super 122, 490 A2d 378, 379 (1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 205 NJ Super 41, 500 A2d 24 (1985).
41 23 Pa Stat § 501(b)(12) (Purdon 1980).
4 NY Dom Rel Law § 236, Part B, (6)(a)(8) (McKinney 1980).
See Washburn, 677 P2d at 158 and Fernau v Fernau, 39 Wash App 695, 706, 694
P2d 1092 (1984). When awarding the alimony, the court looked to the degree to which the
woman had contributed to and enhanced the man's career.
44 Roberto v Brown, 107 Wisc 2d 17, 318 NW2d 358, 360 (1982). See also In Re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wisc 2d 1, 318 NW2d 918 (1982). The Roberto decision shows that
when there is not enough property to divide, the woman can be severely undercompensated
even when she gets 70 percent.
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did not. A foregone opportunity award compensates her for what
she gave up in terms of wages and career development.
Wisconsin, though apparently basing awards on the women's
actual contribution, has referred to the importance of foregone opportunities.4 The New York statute lists "reduced or lost lifetime
earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance as a result of
having foregone or delayed education, training, employment, or career opportunities during the marriage" as a factor to be considered.46 One commentator has relied heavily on this theory of compensation 47 and though neither courts nor legislatures are very
confident in their use of this standard, its theoretical appeal makes
it attractive to some.
3.

Equitable distribution of reduced standard of living.

North Dakota courts have developed another factor to be considered in awarding maintenance. In Weir v Weir,4 s the appellate
court awarded $1,600 a month for three years and $1,500 a month
for the twenty years after that or until re-marriage. The parties
had been married twenty-three years; the husband was earning
over $80,000 a year, but there was minimal property. "The awarding of spousal support in this case is an attempt to provide an equitable sharing of the overall reduction in the parties' separate
standards of living, and properly recognizes [the woman's] role in
contributing to [the man's] earning capacity which was developed
and enhanced during the course of the marriage. ' 4 Again, the criterion of sharing the reduced standard of living is not well developed, but it illustrates the courts' desire to break out of restrictive
statutory guidelines.
4. Expectation.
Finally, many divorce courts feel the need to address the eco45 Roberto, 318 NW2d at 360 (1982) and In Re Marriage of Lundberg,
318 NW2d at
924 (1982). In each case, the court appears to be using restitution as a proxy for foregone
opportunities. The assumption that a restitution remedy is equal to a foregone opportunity
remedy is unfounded, but the courts' expressed concern for foregone opportunities reveals
judicial recognition of the importance of and need to compensate for women's marital
sacrifices.
4" NY Dom Rel Law § 236, Part B, (6)(a)(5) (McKinney 1980).
7 Elisabeth Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J Legal Stud 35 (1978). This piece is
discussed fully in section IV.
48 374 NW2d 858 (ND 1985).
49 Id at 864 (emphasis in original). A Washington court has also referred to equalizing
the reduced standard of living. Washburn, 677 P2d at 158 (1984).
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nomic expectations of the parties. The well-known "lifestyle to
which she's grown accustomed" standard is simply a means of satisfying expectations. Obviously, this consideration necessitates
abandoning the need and rehabilitative standards.
When courts emphasize expectation they are more likely to
award permanent alimony. 0 Even states that follow the Uniform
Act's need standard sometimes award permanent alimony. 1 In
1987, a Minnesota court found that a woman who was earning $640
a month in a department store was still entitled to permanent alimony. Despite the fact that she was capable of providing something for herself, "her education, skills, and experience ha[d] become outmoded, and her earning capacity ha[d] become
permanently diminished. 5 2 The court recognized that this woman
could not rehabilitate herself to a level of earnings that would reflect her expectations. Thus, although expectation considerations
are not consistently applied, most statutes mention the expectation
of the parties and courts periodically look to expecations when calculating awards.
III.

CRITIQUE OF THE PREVAILING SYSTEM OF MAINTENANCE

As the restitution, foregone opportunities, and expectation
strands make clear, courts do not rely solely on the Uniform Act or
rehabilitation theory, despite what may be legislatively mandated.
The inadequacy of those guidelines forces courts to look beyond
the statutes. This section analyzes the problems with the Uniform
Act, rehabilitation, and permanent alimony.
Need and rehabilitation inevitably fail as standards because
they ignore a woman's contribution in the home. To award something on the basis of need presupposes a level of dependency. If
society truly respects the homemaker's role it must compensate the
woman for her services, not reduce her to a level of dependency
because she has performed them.
11 See, for example, In Re Marriage of Duke, 161 Cal Rptr 444, 101 Cal App 3d 152,
159 (1980).
11Indeed, some courts may award permanent alimony precisely because the Uniform
Act is so strict. Permanent alimony provides a way of bypassing the strict need calculations
when equity seems to demand higher compensation for the woman.
52 Lunde v Lunde, 408 NW2d 888, 892-93 (Minn App 1987). The permanent award in
this case may be attributable to the Minnesota Legislature's decision to amend its adaptation of the Uniform Act so that "nothing in [the Act] should be construed to favor a temporary award of maintenance over a permanent award." 31 Minn Stat § 518.552(3) (1986).
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A. The Uniform Act's Need Standard
The first two prongs of the Uniform Act, which require that
the dependent spouse lack sufficient property and be unable to
support herself through appropriate employment, impose a need
standard that leaves women severely undercompensated. The need
standard is extraordinarily difficult for divorcing women to meet,
and often results in denial of maintenance altogether. For example,
Missouri courts denied any maintenance to a wife who was not employed during most of a twenty-four year marriage5" and to the
wife in a ten year marriage who worked, but earned less than half
of what her husband earned. 4 Neither woman had sufficient need.
Unless the mandatory need standard is met, the courts will
not even look at the secondary factors that the statute's drafters
thought might be appropriate in determining maintenance. Thus,
if the wife lacks sufficient need, a court cannot take into account
factors such as the duration of the marriage, the standard of living
established during the marriage, or the age and physical
and emo55
tional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance.
Furthermore, the need standard requires evaluations of property that lead to inconsistent results. In determining whether there
is sufficient property to meet a woman's financial needs, courts
must speculate and sometimes prescribe how a woman should use
her property. A woman is generally not required to "use up" her
property in order to support herself, but the court can decide that
a more efficient use of property would produce more income and
eliminate the need for maintenance. 6 For instance, what happens
to the woman who has valuable family heirlooms, but few liquid
resources and no way to adequately support herself? The need
standard appears to require the woman to sell those heirlooms, despite what her husband of however many years might have earned
and be capable of paying in maintenance.
The need standard also reinforces the harsh treatment women
receive under rehabilitative maintenance guidelines. The problems
with rehabilitation are developed fully in part B of this section,
Roberts v Roberts, 652 SW2d 325, 330 (Mo App 1983).
Satterfield v Satterfield, 635 SW2d 80 (Mo App 1982).
"5UMDA § 308, 9 Unif L Annot at 347 (quoted in full in note 28).
" For an example of inconsistency within one state, compare Ruskin v Ruskin, 153 Ariz
504, 738 P2d 779, 781 (1987), where the wife was not required to exhaust her property award
in order to support herself, with Deatherage v Deatherage, 140 Ariz 317, 681 P2d 469, 472
(1984), where the court offset the need for maintenance against "property capable of producing income or otherwise transformed in order to provide for the reasonable needs of the
spouse."
53
51
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but it is important to emphasize that the Uniform Act's need standard does not avoid and indeed exacerbates all of the problems
with rehabilitation. Even when courts make a finding of need and
award rehabilitation under the Act, they undercompensate women
by emphasizing the strictness of the need standard.
For example, Karen Novick was married for twenty-two years
to a securities broker with an annual income of $140,000. After
their separation, she began to work part time in a book store. She
had earned $1,500 the previous year and borrowed $59,000 from
her parents. She continued to take care of two of the couple's three
children, one of whom was mentally retarded. A Minnesota appeals
court upheld a ruling that the loan from Mrs. Novick's parents was
a gift and permitted a maintenance award of $2,000 a month for
two years and $1,000 per month for an additional three years.
Although the statute lists seven factors to be considered in
determining a maintenance award, the essential consideration
is the financial need of the spouse receiving maintenance, and
the ability to meet that need, balanced against the financial
condition of the spouse providing the maintenance .... Karen
was awarded a substantial amount of property. The child support payments she receives are adequate [though lower than
the state guidelines]. She has one and a half years of college
and has demonstrated an ability to hold down part time
57
jobs.
Mrs. Novick met the threshold need test, but because the essential
consideration was financial need, she was only given enough to rehabilitate herself out of need, not to rehabilitate herself into appropriate employment. Thus, need pervades all determinations
under the Uniform Act, even once courts have determined that
threshold need has been established.
B.

The Rehabilitation Standard

Even without the Uniform Act's need standard, rehabilitation
leaves women undercompensated. Rehabilitation often requires
women to get retrained or newly educated at an age when many
men will soon enjoy pension plans and retirement. Forcing women
to start new jobs at advanced ages makes the rehabilitative concept appear highly inequitable.
17 Novick v Novick, 366 NW2d 330, 331-334 (Minn App 1985). See also Otis v Otis, 299
NW2d 114, 117 (Minn App 1980), stressing the importance of the need standard in justifying a low maintenance award.
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Other equally important aspects of the rehabilitative scheme's
harshness can be attributed to its failure to take important criteria
into account. Rehabilitation looks at what the dependent spouse
needs to rehabilitate herself. Essentially this is another need standard and hence the same criticisms apply. Thus, in states following
the Uniform Act, courts actually use an explicit primary need standard and an implicit secondary need standard. In states that have
adopted rehabilitative alimony without the Act's explicit threshold
need test, courts must still find that need is established before considering a plethora of other relevant factors. 8
As it stands, the only recognition of the standard of living sustained during the marriage is captured in the concept of allowing
the wife to find "suitable" employment. However, the court's view
of what is "suitable" often bears no relation to the couple's station
in life at the time of divorce, or to the wife's contributions in establishing that position. 59 In addition to being intuitively fair, factors such as the woman's contribution, the time spent raising children and the relative earning capabilities are often explicitly listed
in the statutes, 60 and yet are regularly ignored.
The problems with rehabilitation are not limited to the small
awards milked out of the implicit need test, however. The rehabilitative standard operates as an incentive for a woman to avoid economic self-reliance during marriage and just after separation. A
58 See, for example, Wilhelm, 688 SW2d 381 (disregarding the length of the marriage);
Otis, 299 NW2d 114 (disregarding the wife's contribution to the husband's career and the
husband's ability to pay); Shurtliff v Shurtliff, 112 Idaho 1031, 739 P2d 330 (1987) (disregarding the contribution of the woman in the home, despite the fact that her husband did
not want her to work or go to school).
Some courts, however, have tried to consider other factors in conjunction with rehabilitation. See Kulakowski v Kulakowski, 191 NJ Super 609, 468 A2d 733 (1983) (considering
the woman's contribution to the man's career); Hanson v Hanson, 378 NW2d 28 (Minn App
1985) (considering the man's ability to pay when he went to Taiwan to find a wife, found
one, brought her back to this country and proceeded to divorce her less than two years
later).
" See, for example, Otis, 299 NW2d 114. Mr. Otis earned $120,000 a year, plus bonuses.
Mrs. Otis had entertained extensively for her husband's company and even had been interviewed for her husband's last promotion. Id at 118. Because she had been an executive
secretary prior to the marriage and there was testimony that after a few years of reintegration, she should be able to earn between $12,000 and $18,000 a year, she was awarded only
an average of $1,500 a month for four years. Id at 115. The husband's ability to pay more
was expressly rejected as a criterion to be considered. Id at 117. Neither did the court consider the nature of her contribution to the marriage, her expectation of a relatively high
standard of living, or what careers besides that of executive secretary she might choose for
herself.
6OSee, for example, New York (NY Dom Rel Law § 236(B)(6)(a) (McKinney 1986)),
Florida (Fla Stat § 61.08(2) (1986)), and Pennsylvania (23 Pa Stat § 501(a)(2) (Purdon
1980)).
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woman who has worked outside the home and raised the children
during the marriage is awarded less than a woman who only raised
the children."1 The woman who has worked outside the home has
the highest chance of being denied all maintenance and the fulltime housewife has the highest chance of getting permanent alimony or a substantial rehabilitative award.62 The working woman
probably has relied less on her husband's earning potential than
her homemaker counterpart, but the smaller amount of compensation she receives is often highly disproportionate to her actual ability to achieve financial independence. Courts do not look to the
degree to which a woman's demonstrated earning ability actually
enhances her ability to provide for herself appropriately. The analysis often stops when a court sees that the woman can earn any63
thing at all

The cases reflect this problem. A woman who has the wherewithal to establish an IRA for herself is seen as less deserving than
the woman who lacks such financial resources.6 4 Women who are
lucky enough to be able to rely on their parents in the desperate
times right after the separation are penalized for so doing. 5 Thus,
maintenance awards based on need encourage spouses to appear as
helpless and dependent as possible up until the time that the
award is made. This incentive undermines the theoretical purpose
of rehabilitative alimony - to encourage women to become selfsufficient and not to rely on the traditional notions of male
support.
In addition, the rehabilitative maintenance standard has been
extremely difficult to apply. The standard definition is "the time
necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to find appropriate employment." 6 "Sufficient" education or training and "appropriate" employment are very ambiguous terms, subject to a
great deal of inconsistent application by the courts. "Appropriate"
can mean very different things to different judges and the woman's
desires are often completely disregarded.
See, for example, Snell v Snell, 205 Mont 359, 668 P2d 238 (1983).
Other commentators' data support this. In McLindon's study, 45% of the housewives, but only 20% of the working women received alimony awards in the 1980's.
61
62

McLindon, 21 Family L Q at 363 (cited in note 2). In marriages that lasted more than 10
years, Weitzman found housewives more than twice as likely as working women to be
awarded maintenance. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution at 176 (cited in note 4).
6" See Manbeck v Manbeck, 339 Pa Super 493, 498 A2d 748 (1985); Wilhelm, 688 SW2d
381; Otis, 299 NW2d 114 (Minn 1980); Novick, 366 NW2d 330.
" In Re Marriage of Donovan, 122 Ill
App 3d 803, 462 NE2d 9, 12 (1984).
6" See Cannon v Cannon, 723 P2d 951 (Mont 1986).
64 UMDA § 308(b)(2), 9 Unif L Annot 348 (cited in note 11).
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For instance, an Idaho court allowed a woman to seek a fiveyear microbiology degree,67 but a New York court overturned a
lower court award that would have allowed a woman to pursue a
medical degree. The New York appellate court found that "appropriate" employment meant a $10,000 a year job that the woman
could get at the time, not a medical degree that she desired but
that would have taken several years to secure.6 8
When courts do look at what women want, they often fail to
understand critical differences between choices made while married and desires once divorced. One court overturned as excessive a
lower court's award to a college-educated mother who had a job as
a typist during the marriage. The court noted that her salary appeared modest but that she chose to retain her present job for personal reasons.6 " This determination fails to recognize that a woman, particularly the mother of a small child, might "choose" a
lower paying job while married. If she does, and subsequently gets
divorced in a rehabilitative maintenance jurisdiction, a court will
penalize her for this choice by assuming that she already has appropriate employment. A woman who chooses a high powered career despite her motherhood will fare better because she has "chosen" lucrative employment. Yet, the factors that go into choosing
employment will be very different if there is another breadwinner
in the household. Satisfaction with a lower paying job when another spouse is earning money concurrently is not likely to translate into satisfaction with a lower paying job when that spouse is
no longer contributing. Courts simply ignore the difference between appropriate employment in single parent households and
appropriate employment in two income households. 0
Shurtliff, 739 P2d at 333-34 (Shepard dissenting).

Morgan v Morgan, 52 NY2d 804, 383 NYS2d 343 (1976). Other examples abound. A
Minnesota appellate court found secretarial work to be appropriate work for a corporate
vice-president's wife. The wife's potential desire to pursue a different career was not considered by the court. Otis, 299 NW2d at 115. A New York court ordered a lower court to award
the reasonable cost of the woman's post-graduate education, but as the dissent pointed out,
the record was devoid of any indication that the woman expressed a desire to return to
school: "[Ilf [this woman] refuses to return to school, is she left without a remedy?" O'Brien
v O'Brien, 106 App Div 2d 223, 485 NYS2d 548, 559, 560 (Thompson concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
9 Shanahan v Shanahan, 80 App Div 2d 738, 437 NYS2d 169, 170 (1981).
70 This problem may be exacerbated by traditional notions of appropriate spousal earning levels. One study shows 30% of female magazine readers suggesting they would turn
down a job that paid more than their husband earned. In a different study, 25.7% of white
men and 38.8% of black men said men should feel inadequate if their wives earn more than
they do. Reskin and Hartman, Women's Work at 69 (cited in note 18). In light of this strong
social pressure for women to take lower paying jobs while married in order not to offend
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This problem is compounded by the parental demands in a
divorced, one-parent household. Inescapable parental duties, such
as staying home with a sick child or picking up children from daycare, can no longer be split between two wage-earners. Simultaneously, the income from the non-custodial parent's earnings and the
economies of scale involved in sharing basic necessities are gone.
Thus, the need for a higher income increases as the ability to take
a more demanding job decreases.
In sum, the rehabilitative standard prohibits courts from considering most of the factors that statutes list as relevant because
the rehabilitation concept effectively only looks at what a woman
needs. If need is not apparent, other factors are ignored. The standard also excludes any consideration of what women may choose to
do and denies the real differences between "appropriate" income
in two and one parent households. Rehabilitation encourages
women to become either completely dependent on their spouses,
thus making need obvious, or in contrast, completely independent,
thus making need truly non-existent. Encouraging women to exist
at either of these two extremes destroys any theoretically desirable
notion of equitably sharing inevitable marital sacrifices.
C. Permanent Alimony
Permanent alimony, based on a duty to support, attempts to
reduce the harshness of the need standard and is still awarded on
occasion." Unlike either the Uniform Act or the rehabilitative
standard, permanent alimony addresses a woman's future security
interest by providing her with lifelong support. This is most important in long marriages where a woman's contributions to the marriage are likely to be quite significant, her foregone opportunities
are likely to be numerous, and her ability to re-enter the work
force is likely to be particularly difficult. After a twenty year marriage, both parties have a reasonable expectation of continuing to
live at the standard that they have jointly worked to establish.
However, the rationale for permanent alimony is outdated and
its implementation is infeasible. The idea that men have an automatic responsibility to support women is rooted in a concept of
female dependency destructive to gender equality. Men as men
should not have a duty to support the women they marry. Such a
notions of masculinity, it hardly seems correct to presume that lower paying jobs are appropriate or would be chosen after these women are divorced.
"1 See section I.C.4.
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duty assumes that our genders, not our voluntary agreements, prescribe our obligations. This flaw is most obvious when one considers how inappropriate permanent alimony seems at the end of a
short term marriage or after a marriage where both spouses have
worked outside the home in comparable jobs and have contributed
to the marriage in exactly the same ways.
Furthermore, permanent alimony locks parties who are seeking to terminate their legal relationship into a continuing economic
relationship. Ideally, maintenance or alimony awards should act as
a way of settling the legal obligations, not perpetually continuing
them. As mentioned in section I, on-going financial relationships
with an ex-spouse, though inevitable, should be minimized to the
extent that the court can compensate the dependent spouse all at
once. Thus, though permanent alimony may prevent some of the
hardships of a need standard, its theoretical and practical flaws
make it an unacceptable alternative.
IV.

ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS - THE CONTRACT PARADIGM

Many of the problems with need and rehabilitation result
from the absence of any coherent concept of what alimony is or
should be. One of the more appealing aspects of permanent alimony is its logical relationship to its underlying rationale, i.e., the
man's obligation to support. But the support obligation rationale is
incompatible with modern notions of gender roles. Two fairly recent and important economic commentaries that have tried to refine the modern concept of alimony have focused on contract as
the appropriate paradigm for awarding maintenance.
In a 1978 article, Elisabeth Landes presented a description
and economic model for alimony, suggesting that alimony compensates a woman for her foregone opportunities-the cost she incurred by investing in the marriage. 7 Landes makes several important points regarding the specialization of labor within the
marriage and the need to compensate for that specialization. However, some of her assumptions are flawed, and because she suggests
measuring foregone opportunities in terms of potential future income, she does not accurately calculate the costs women have incurred in the past.
Landes assumes that the degree of a woman's household specialization correlates positively with the likelihood of a permanent
7' Elisabeth M. Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J Legal Stud 35, 44-49 (1978).
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marriage. 73 That is, the more likely a woman is to divorce, the less
likely she is to specialize in household services. As a consequence,
the length of marriage becomes relevant in calculating the extent
of a woman's household contribution.
Of course, the extent of contribution is a function of the
length of marriage, simply because in a longer marriage the woman
has been contributing for more years. Yet, contrary to Landes's
contention, this is not true on a per year basis. Landes does not
support her assumption that the extent of a woman's household
contribution correlates negatively with the likelihood of divorce.
She offers two assertions that she claims are consistent with the
assumption. First, she notes that divorcing couples have fewer children, which implies a reduced level of household specialization.
Second, she contends that black women are more likely than white
women to participate in the labor force because they recognize that
their chances of divorce are higher. 4
That divorced couples have fewer children and that black
women participate more in the labor market are certainly empirical facts, but they hardly prove that the amount a woman invests
in a marriage is contingent on her reasonable expectation of divorce. One reason divorced couples may have fewer children is that
they get divorced before they have more children. This does not
necessarily show that divorced couples chose not to invest as
highly in household specialization because their chances of divorce
were high. The woman's household specialization may be just as
great in a two child marriage as it is in a six child marriage. What
determines a woman's level of household specialization is a function of numerous economic, personal, religious, and cultural factors
that may have nothing to do with the likelihood of her divorce.
This point is made even more clear in the case of black
women. Black women work because, on the whole, black families
are poor and black women need to earn money.7 5 There is no proof
that black women work because they realize that their chances of
divorce are high. Landes's desire to compensate women for the
amount of their investment in a marriage is appropriate, but the
assumption that a woman's chances of getting divorced influence
her decision to invest in the marriage is unfounded.
A more fundamental problem with Landes's analysis is her

73

Id at 44.

Id.
See Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract of the United States 429-434, (GPO,
103d ed 1982-83).
74

71
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methodology for evaluating opportunity costs. While the idea of
trying to compensate women for the opportunity costs incurred is
very appealing, it is almost impossible to truly measure foregone
opportunities. There is simply no way to know what a woman's
potential life might have been like had she not provided household
labor for ten, twenty or thirty years.
Landes suggests looking at the difference between the earning
capacity of the divorcing wife and that of the divorcing husband as
a measure of loss of the woman's earning potential. 6 Using this
difference as a proxy for foregone opportunity is probably valid in
theory. The problem is that in the frequent instances when the
husband-wife earnings gap is very large, Landes suggests looking to
the future for a more accurate assessment.7 7 For instance, she suggests that a woman's re-marriage or change of job should alter the
amount of alimony to which she is entitled. 8 Yet, if alimony is
rooted in the idea of what she gave up in the past, it is hard to see
why the future should matter. A true evaluation of foregone opportunities should focus on the past. Under Landes'sparadigm, a woman will be penalized (by not getting alimony) for doing well after
the marriage has dissolved, even though performance after the
marriage has little to do with the opportunities she forewent in the
past.
Landes's model also falls to take into account the nature or
duration of the woman's contribution. For instance, it does not
compensate a woman who paid for her husband's professional education and then left the work force. The woman who paid for her
husband's legal training during their three year marriage and got
divorced shortly thereafter is not treated any differently than the
woman who contributed nothing to her husband's education.
Heavy investments in short term marriages are severely
undercompensated.
Thus, while Landes's theory remains attractive and her recognition of the importance of household specialization is very important, the mechanism she offers for measuring the cost of household
specialization is inadequate. It is based on several flawed assumptions, it does not compensate for heavy short-term investments,
and it measures past costs in terms of the future potential of both
husband and wife, thus leaving the courts with a standard that is
highly speculative, discretionary and difficult to enforce.

7 Landes, 7 J Legal Stud at 50 (cited in note 71).
" Id at 51.
78

Id.
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More recently, Lloyd Cohen has written that women fare less
well than men in divorce proceedings because women depreciate
more readily in the marriage market than do men.7 9 Alimony, he
argues, should theoretically try to compensate for the fact that
women have a harder time re-contracting. He suggests, however,
that legal determinations cannot ever fully capture the depreciation factor and emphasizes the need to rely on informal and social
sanctions and the "good moral sense of the parties."' 0
Cohen may be right in asserting that the law is not capable of
addressing a problem of female depreciation in the marriage market, but his basic thesis is flawed. Cohen assumes that because
women do not re-marry as much as men do, women depreciate
more."' Yet many women, particularly divorced women, may
choose to remain single. The absence of re-marriage may reflect
not depreciation but conscious choices to withdraw from the marriage market.
Cohen also assumes that spousal compensation should act as
sustenance until a woman re-marries. This is a limited, anachronistic view of alimony. The role of alimony is not to sustain a woman
until she can find a new person with whom to enter into a marriage
agreement. It is to compensate a woman for the economic hardship
incurred because of the joint marital decisions that precluded her
from adequately providing for her own financial well-being. It is
with this compensation rationale in mind that the following solution is offered.
V. A FORMULA FOR SPOUSAL COMPENSATION
Both Landes and Cohen rely on some notion of contract; the
following proposed model expands on that notion. Marriage is a
unique contract. Rarely are there written terms and the expected
length of the relationship means that assigned responsibilities and
expectations can change drastically over time. Still, economic relationships are an undeniable part of most marriages. Contract models may not be a perfect way of viewing marriage, but contract
remedies can provide a helpful and equitable paradigm to solve the
economic problems of marriage dissolution.
One criticism of the contract paradigm is that contract remeLloyd Cohen, Marriage,Divorce, and Quasi Rents; or, "I Gave Him the Best Years
of My Life", 16 J Legal Stud 267, 278 (1987).
80 Id

at 303.

81 Cohen never fully describes what he means by depreciation, but the mere use of the
word conveys a disturbing perspective.
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dies involve evaluating breach and breach has traditionally been
associated with fault. Modern divorce law has recognized that divorce is not necessarily anyone's fault, and few would want to reintroduce fault considerations. It should be emphasized, however,
that the concept of fault has never been a legally recognized basis
for contract damages.8 2 In fact, many argue that contracts can and
should be broken when it is efficient to do so, without one party
assuming the blame.8 3 Whether one accepts the notion of a blameless breach in pure contract theory or not, however, the proposed
pseudo-contract model emphatically does not involve fault.
A. Costs and Benefits of Marriage
As discussed in section I, monetary awards are necessary because the courts do not define economic security as property and
hence do not equitably divide it at marriage dissolution. Neither of
the current terms for monetary compensation following a divorce-alimony and maintenance-appropriately describes what
this comment proposes: spousal compensation. The compensation
called for in this comment is awarded separately and in addition to
an equitable division of marital property. It recognizes that the nature of the marital agreement includes an expectation of future economic security. By failing to evaluate that security interest,
courts have failed to consider one of the key terms of the marital
contract.
The proposed model reimburses a woman for the intangible
benefits she is precluded from receiving because of divorce. When
a marriage stays intact, the intangible benefit, i.e., future security,
represents the payment or consideration from husband to wife, for
the wife's contribution to the marriage. This contribution, the consideration from wife to husband, includes household chores, but it
also involves the value of the union itself. The husband gained
One indication of this is that contract remedies do not include punitive damages.
See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis Of Law 88-89, (Little,
Brown, 2d ed 1977). Some might argue that breaching a promise of marital fidelity cannot
be morally neutral and that therefore the faithful spouse (i.e., the non-breaching party)
should be awarded more compensation. Not all marriages involve promises of fidelity, however, and infidelity does not inevitably dissolve the marital contract. Thus, the courts need
not necessarily evaluate how the contract was breached or who breached. The unavoidable
problems attendant upon assigning fault in divorce proceedings are well documented. See
Max Rheinstein, Marriage,Stability,Divorce and the Law 62-63 (Chicago, 1973) and Clark,
Domestic Relations at 419 (cited in note 8). The divorce proceeding should only be concerned with equitably resolving the economic hardship caused by the dissolved economic
agreement.
82
83
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from the existence of the marriage; the woman needs to be compensated for that contribution.
To a certain extent, both men and women gain from the existence of the marriage itself. However, for men, and not for women,
that gain often translates into measurable economic benefit. Solomon Polacheck has found that "wages at any point in time are
related to the amount and continuity of past as well as expected
future labor market experience." 84 He also found that although
never-married men and women have roughly the same labor market participation rate, married men have by far the highest participation rate and married women the lowest."5 Thus, because it is
likely that a married man will have worked more in the past and
will work more in the future, he will earn more money than single
men, single women, and married women. Similarly, of course, married women will earn the least of all.
Another study found that marriage increased the earnings of
professional men by 12 percent, but had no effect on the earnings
of professional women.88 Thus, a man's benefit from marriage includes measurable market compensation in addition to any gain in
unpaid household work. Whether this gain is the result of sex discrimination or women's choices to participate less in the paid labor
force, the relevant point for this analysis is that part of what a
married woman contributes and part of what future security compensates her for is the gain her husband has realized and the gain
that she has not realized. The proposed model uses specific percentages to value a woman's security interest. Before evaluating
these percentages in detail, it will be helpful to explore the theory
behind the detailed evaluation.
A wife's equitable share of economic security will depend both
on the total amount her husband has earned and on the portion of
that income the wife has earned. The proposed model assumes that
the more a woman has worked in the home, the more marriagebased security she has earned. If a woman has never worked
I Solomon William Polacheck, Women in the Economy: Perspectives on Gender Inequality in US Commission on Civil Rights, Comparable Worth: Issue for the 80's 34, 43
(1984)(emphasis in original).
8' Id at 42.
86 Paul Osterman, Sex Discriminationin Professional Employment: A Case Study, 32
Indus & Labor Rel Rev 451, 458 (1979).
87 For a discussion of the choice/discrimination debate see id at 458-462. Even if one
adopts a choice theory, a married woman's choice to stay home should be seen as a joint
decision. Since the husband is part of the economic unit that made the decision, he should
be equally responsible for any negative economic consequences of that choice.
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outside the home, it is logical to assume that she has done more
household work, invested more in terms of foregone opportunities,
relied more on the marriage and thereby earned more of the security her husband can provide than the woman who has also been a
wage earner. The full-time homemaker is thus entitled to more
compensation.
This calculus relies heavily on the actual numbers of hours a
woman has spent working in the home; it does not directly capture
the value the woman gave to the union itself. Still, it is a reasonable approximation. Measuring a woman's contribution involves
evaluating how the two parties in question have valued the woman's work. In dividing labor, couples presumably try to maximize
the value of the union. If both spouses work outside the home and
share equally in the household tasks, the model assumes that they
have received equal economic benefit from the union. If the woman
has disproportionately contributed to the household, the model assumes that the man, to that point, has received more economic
benefit from the union. He has reaped the economic benefits that
married men enjoy in the wage market and his wife has suffered
and will continue to suffer the economic hardship that the wage
market imposes on married women. If the division of labor is to be
value-maximizing for both of them, it must be assumed that much
of the value of the union for the woman was to come in the economic security she had been earning. Spousal compensation will
ensure that upon divorce the woman will get paid for the benefit
that the couple chose for her to defer.
Capturing the future security she has earned is problematic,
however. Her interest is a function of what her husband would be
capable of providing if they continued to share all wealth. But, as
has been discussed, the problems with looking to the future are
paramount. Thus, the proposed model looks backward to find how
much future security the wife earned each year during the
marriage. 8
A contrast with the Landes approach is illustrative. Landes
proposes looking to the future as a way of approximating what the
woman gave up in the past. This model looks to the past to approximate what the woman has earned in terms of the future. The
proposed model does not look at what the woman gave up, but at
the security that she earned while working for her husband in the
88

The ordinary remedy for a contract breach is expectation damages, but it is unrealis-

tic in a divorce setting to attempt to compensate a woman to the extent of her true expecta-

tions, without impoverishing the man.

1220

The University of Chicago Law Review

[55:1193

home. The amount of security the woman has earned, and hence
the amount of unpaid compensation she is entitled to at divorce, is
a function of what her husband was earning while she was working
for him.
This comment's formulaic proposal can be seen as part of the
effort to come up with a legal definition of marriage that incorporates modern theories of gender roles without denying the modern
reality of women's sacrifices. The theoretical imperfections inherent in strict formulas often make them unappealing to legal scholars. Yet, it is clear from the post-divorce impoverishment of
women and children that judicial discretion is an unacceptable alternative to theoretical imperfection. Furthermore, courts have already used formulas in another area of family law, child-support.8 9
Judges and legislatures do not pretend that child-support formulas
are perfect, but formulas are used because they are relatively successful at alleviating much of the economic hardship that divorce
imposes on children. The exact figures in this model may need to
be refined by an accountant or economist, but the basic structure,
rooted in contract theory, provides an equitable and clear way to
remedy the economic damage incurred at marriage dissolution.
B. The Proposed Model
1.

Restitution.

As a preliminary matter, all courts should evaluate the degree
to which the dependent spouse has monetarily enriched the other
spouse. The wife should be compensated automatically for her
monetary contribution to her husband because he has been enriched at her expense. This restitution remedy, where appropriate,
should be given regardless of length of marriage, number of children, or division of labor within the marriage. The most straightforward example of this would arise when a wife paid for all or
part of her husband's education. If the wife contributed $20,000 to
her husband's education, she should, at an absolute minimum, be
awarded the present value at the time of divorce of $20,000.90 Sev11 See Caleb Foot, Robert J. Levy and Frank E. Sander, Cases and Materials on Family Law 702-704 (Little, Brown, 1985).
90 One court has commented that "[ilt is only fair that [the wife] be compensated for
her costs and foregone opportunities resulting from her support of [her husband]." In Re
Marriageof Lundberg, 107 Wisc 2d 1, 318 NW2d 918, 924 (1982). Mrs. Lundberg contributed $30,000 more to the marriage than the husband did. She was awarded $25,000. Though
the Court referred to the $25,000 as compensation for foregone opportunities, the sum actually represents only a restitution remedy and does not capture her additional opportunity
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eral courts have already begun to do this,9 ' although this proposal
would legitimate and clarify use of restitution as a remedy by all
courts.

92

Restitution is not a complete remedy, but is rather a floor - a
minimum compensation payment to be awarded in all divorce settlements if the husband has been enriched by his wife's contribution. It can only be awarded in marriages where the extent of the
wife's monetary contribution is capable of determination. Where
the wife made a determinable monetary contribution only, she
would be entitled only to a restitution remedy. Where, as in most
cases, the wife also made non-monetary contributions in the home,
she would be entitled to restitution and reliance.
2.

Reliance.

The far more problematic calculation is the extent of economic
security earned by the wife because of her non-monetary contributions to the marriage. In the rare marriage involving only a restitution remedy, the wife does not rely on the husband's future earning potential. Her contribution is monetary. It is easy to label,
quantify and return to her. In any marriage where there is a disproportionate division of household labor, or household specialization,"' however, a woman relies on the security her husband can
provide and she earns a future share of that security as she works
in the home. The wage-earning husband owes his wife for that future security because he has not yet fully paid for the benefit he
has reaped and the loss she has suffered by their joint decision to
assign her more household labor. 4
Because of the inherent difficulties in calculating the value of
household services, the man's earnings serve as an approximation

costs. Any tabulation of a woman's foregone opportunities should be in addition to her direct monetary outlay and not part of a restitution calculation.
"
See section II.C.1.
*' One court has rejected the term "unjust enrichment" for fear that the term "unjust"
would re-introduce allegations of fault into divorce proceedings, yet that court instructed
the lower court to consider the amount of money the wife contributed to her husband's
education. Washburn v Washburn, 101 Wash 2d 168, 677 P2d 152, 157-159 (1984). In the

future, courts need not let fears of fault determinations hinder their evaluations of how
husbands are enriched at their wives' expense. If it is clear that fault is irrelevant, the term
unjust enrichment is far less problematic.
"' "Household specialization" is Elisabeth Landes's term for uncompensated household
work. Landes, 7 J Legal Stud at 40-41 (cited in note 72).
' The model would not require that this decision be a documented, or even conscious,
agreement. As long as the dependent spouse has done more household work, the court can
imply a joint decision to divide labor in that way.
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of the economic security owed to the woman. Assuming a valuemaximizing couple, this approximation makes sense: the wife
would not "give up" economic security unless the couple expected
a comparable gain by the husband.
The burden of proof to establish or refute a presumption of a
disproportionate division of labor could be on either party, but if
the wife has to prove household specialization, the court should
make it an easy burden to meet.9 5 Evidence regarding the number
of hours a day or week spent on household chores would be the
appropriate means of establishing that the woman performed more
labor in the household than did her husband. Once the division of
labor has been established, a court could then evaluate the extent
of the woman's contribution by looking at the amount of monetary
compensation the woman forewent. This would require the court
to evaluate the degree to which the woman worked outside the
home.
The proposed formula involves three general categories. The
full-time outside worker (40 hours or more per week) who also performed most of the household chores; the part-time outside
worker, who most probably spent more time on household chores
than the full-time worker; and the full-time housewife, who presumably did the most household work. Each woman would be
awarded a percentage of her husband's earnings during the years
in which she disproportionately contributed to the household.,"
This comment suggests the following figures: for the full-time
worker, 10 percent of her husband's income for all the years in
which she earned money outside the home; for the full-time housewife, 30 percent of her husband's earnings for the years in which
she stayed at home;9 7 for the part-time worker, 20 percent if she
11 There is certainly a valid argument that, given the status quo in the division of
household labor, a certain division should be presumed and it would be the husband's burden to refute the presumption of disproportionate labor division. Most women do much
more household labor than do their husbands. Assuming the existence of a disproportionate
division unless the man can prove that he contributed equally may utilize judicial resources
more efficiently.
' Data from U.S. time-budget studies lend credence to these categories. In 1975-76,
married women holding full-time jobs spent 25 hours a week on work in the household.
Married men working full time spent 13 hours a week. Married, part-time female wageearners spent 33 hours working in the home and full-time housewives averaged 41 hours of
work in the home. June O'Neill, EarningDifferentials: EmpiricalEvidence and Causes, in
Gunther Schmid and Renate Weitzel, eds, Sex Discriminationand Equal Opportunity: The
Labor Market and Employment Policy 69, 75 (St. Martin's Press, 1984).
17 The ceiling at 30 percent, not 50 percent, is explained by the fact that a woman
has
already been compensated to a certain extent with the food, clothing and shelter that her
husband has provided during the course of the marriage. Again, these figures may be more
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worked twenty hours a week, or proportionally more or less than
20 percent depending on the actual number of hours she worked. A
woman who worked thirty hours a week outside the home would be
awarded 15 percent of her husband's earnings for those years, and
a woman who worked ten hours a week would be awarded 25 percent of her husband's earnings.
It is important to emphasize that the reliance remedy does not
compensate the woman for the fair market value of her services;
her compensation is measured in terms of her husband's earnings
because she worked for nothing in expectation of her husband's
future security. 8 The husband's earnings were part of the marriage
contract. In this sense, the economic commitments of marriage
provide dependent spouses with a pension plan. What they pay in
is their services. What they get out, however, is not the fair market
value of those services, because the market does not value those
services appropriately. 9 A woman's future benefits are determined,
instead, by what her husband can provide. By failing to capture
the security interest for which dependent spouses work, contemporary alimony and maintenance provisions rob women of the pension they earn.
In theory, all maintenance awards should be due when they
are determined or a very short time thereafter. The monthly payment practice is rooted in the concept of support, not compensation. Once maintenance is viewed as compensation for a failed contract, the amount owed should be viewed as any other debt due on
demand. Of course, if the maintenance award is sizable, one-time
payments will not be feasible and the court will need to determine
a payment schedule that is fair to both parties.10 0 Whatever the
payment schedule, however, the full debt should be incurred at the
time of the award. No future contingency (re-marriage, co-habitation) should alter the amount of the payment because it is a debt
owed for services given. The amount of maintenance has nothing
to do with the future, so the future should not effect the award.

or less appropriate in different situations. But workable fixed approximations will end up
being far more equitable than the judicial discretion inherent in case-by-case adjudication.

"IThere are some marital arrangements that will not fall neatly into this model. For
instance, if the husband has paid his wife all along, by giving her money that she keeps
separately and does not spend on family necessities and expenses, this money would have to

be subtracted from the formula determination.
" See section II.B.

In making the payment schedule, the courts must recognize that the standard of
living for both parties will go down. It is cheaper to live together than apart, and both
parties must bear this overall reduction in living standard.
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3. Examples.
Hypothetical examples may help illustrate how the calculations would work. Mrs. A contributed $4,000 to her husband's
medical education. After her husband was through with school,
they both worked at full time jobs for three years, though she did
more of the household labor because Dr. A spent more hours in the
work place than she did. The couple divorced after these three
years, having been married for eight years. Under a rehabilitative
regime, Mrs. A might get the money she contributed to her husband's education 0 1 , but that is far from certain and she would definitely not get anything in addition. Under the proposed regime,
she would get the present value of the $4,000 plus 10 percent of
Dr. A's income for the three years that he earned it. If Mrs. A also
had done more household work during the years her husband was
in school, there would be no husband's income for those years from
which she would be entitled to 10 percent. In that case, the
formula would determine his average annual earning level for the
course of the marriage and give her 10 percent of that for the number of years she worked full-time while he was a student. She is
entitled to the 10 percent reliance remedy for those years because
she was working in the home in expectation of what he could
provide.
Mrs. B did not contribute anything to her husband's education. During the marriage, Mr. B moved up through the management positions at a bank. For the first five years of the marriage,
both spouses worked full-time, though Mrs. B performed more of
the household work. When their first child was born, Mrs. B
stopped wage-earning work completely. After five years at home,
however, she returned to work on a part-time basis, and worked
twenty hours a week for five years. Under the Uniform Act's need
standard, Mrs. B might very well get no monetary compensation." 2
Under a rehabilitative regime, she would probably get about $650 a
month for several years.1 03 Under the proposed regime, Mrs. B
would get the present value of 10 percent of her husband's earn,01 See, for example, In Re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wisc 2d 1, 318 NW2d 918, 924
(1982).

102 See, for example, Roberts v Roberts, 652 SW2d 325 (Mo App 1983).

"03 See, for example, In Re Marriageof Pekar, 173 Cal App 3d 367, 369, 218 Cal Rptr
823 (1985). Of course, if Mr. B's income was not substantial enough, Mrs. B could get even
less than $650 a month. On the other hand, a more substantial salary on Mr. B's part would
not mean a greater award. Under a rehabilitative regime, a dependent spouse is given what
she needs, without regard to how much more than that the other spouse can comfortably
pay.
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ings for the years in which they both worked full-time, 30 percent
of her husband's earnings for the years in which she was not working outside the home, and 20 percent of her husband's earnings for
the years in which she worked part-time. All of this would be in
addition to child support payments.
Finally, suppose that Mrs. C was married to Mr. C for thirty
years at the time of their divorce. After working and contributing
$4,000 to her husband's education, she left the paid work force and
worked in the home, raising three children. Under a rehabilitative
regime, Mrs. C would probably get maintenance to support her until her children had reached majority, and then two to three years
of maintenance for her to find suitable employment. 0 4 Her contribution to her husband's education would probably be irrelevant, as
would any expectation of future security to which she might reasonably feel entitled after thirty years of marriage. Under the proposed model, Mrs. C would automatically get the present value of
the $4,000 she contributed to her husband's education. In addition,
she would be entitled to the present value of 30 percent of what
her husband had earned during all the years that she stayed in the
home.
In Mrs. C's case, the court might have to do an additional calculation. It is possible that this formula would require the husband
to pay far more than the wife's reasonable expectation of security
because the marriage lasted long enough for her to have already
consumed a significant amount of security. In that case, courts
would need to look to the future for an alternative figure. The
court should determine 50 percent of all of the man's expected income for the rest of his working life (assuming an appropriate rise
in his current salary to age sixty-five or the likely age of retirement). Mrs. C would be entitled to that figure plus half of the marital property, including pension plans. If this alternative figure is
lower than the standard formula, it should be awarded instead.
Theoretically, one needs to account for consumed security in every
case; thus, this calculation should be done in each instance. As a
practical matter, however, the alternative figure will only be lower
in a marriage of significant duration. 0 5

104
101

See, for example, Dahlberg v Dahlberg, 358 NW2d 76, 82 (Minn App 1984).
In determining this future calculation, a court should be particularly wary of hus-

bands' assertions that they were planning a career change which would reduce their future
earnings level. If the court found such testimony credible, it could compensate the woman
for the future security she expected by awarding her a disproportionate amount of marital
property.
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C. Advantages of the Proposed Model
The proposed model does not simply give women more money;
it eliminates many of the current problems with the rehabilitation
standard. First, the contract paradigm eliminates the problems involved in defining the dependent spouse's "choice," which were so
recurrent in rehabilitative maintenance cases. It does not and
should not matter whether the woman chooses to pursue a more or
less high paying job. She is compensated for the amount that she
enriched her husband and that amount is measured in terms of his
salary or other compensation. Second, the proposed model does
not ordinarily require speculating about the future. Since the
award is determined by looking at behavior during the marriage, it
does not matter whether the dependent spouse wants to pursue an
education after the divorce or when she decides what she wants to
do.
The reliance paradigm also eliminates many of the perverse
incentives that rehabilitative alimony creates. Women who work at
all get less under a rehabilitative regime because they are seen as
less needy. Under this formula, a woman is compensated for what
she has earned while in the home instead of in the work-place;
there are no disincentives to work. 10 6 If a woman chooses to go
back to work, she has spent less time earning security and requires
less compensation than a woman who stayed at home the whole
time. Still, one need not have left the work force completely in
order to be entitled to a reliance remedy. The working woman may
have earned security by foregoing opportunities available to her
during the time she stayed at home or the times in which she subordinated her career. Thus, the formula incorporates the foregone
opportunity theory used by both courts and commentators.
Finally, the formula eliminates the need for permanent alimony, which is essentially an expectation remedy. As has been discussed, expectation is inappropriate because, like a rehabilitation
award, it requires speculative evaluations about the future and it
perpetuates a relationship that the two parties are trying to dis108 Because the percentage of her husband's earnings that a woman is entitled to depends on the extent to which she forewent paid wages herself, this formula treats the woman who did extensive volunteer work the same as the woman who spent all her time in the
home. By foregoing their own careers, both women were making contributions to the marriage and hence need to be compensated. The woman who does volunteer work usually enhances the social and professional status of her husband. He benefits from her work in the
local charity just as he would benefit from her work in the home, and she is doing the
unpaid work in expectation of what he can provide in the future.

19881

Contractingfor Security

1227

solve. The courts' continued use of expectation may be explained
by the apparent harshness of the rehabilitative scheme, particularly in long-term marriages1 0 7 When permanent alimony is
awarded, it is usually justified as the only equitable solution.
Such a retreat to discretionary equity is unnecessary under the
proposed model. A woman's reasonable expectation of economic
security grows as the marriage grows. As the example of Mrs. C
shows, an equitable solution is ensured under the proposed
formula because the longer a woman is married, the larger her
compensation award and the closer that award is to full economic
security.
CONCLUSION

The proposed model should be adopted by legislatures to help
alleviate the hardships created when marriage's economic promises
are broken. Existing guidelines do not work. The need standard,
explicit in the Uniform Act and implicit in the concept of rehabilitative maintenance, denies women any compensation for what they
have contributed, what they have foregone and how much they
have relied. It creates perverse incentives for women to refrain
from self-sufficiency while married and to forego any notion of career advancement. It also requires courts to focus on the future
and to analyze and define what a dependent spouse can choose and
what she should consider adequate.
The proposed formula focuses on the past. It incorporates the
contributions of dependent spouses beyond the contribution that
entitles women to half of the marital property. Marriage almost
always involves economic commitment, contribution, reliance, and
expectation. When the law ignores the extent of the economic contract that marriage entails, it imposes severe hardships on dependent spouses. Contract remedy paradigms such as this one provide
guidelines that help alleviate those hardships.
Women's contributions may continue to be undervalued and,
though a contract model encourages payment in full at the time of
the award, if continuing payments are necessary, nothing insures
that the non-dependent spouse will pay what he owes. Still, the
proposed remedy provides a theoretical basis and a practical
framework for properly considering the scope of the damage rendered by the dissolution of the economic agreements implicit in
marriage.

107 See section II.C.4.

